Corono the Mexican Beers Marketing Strategy Essay Example For Students

Corono the Mexican Beers Marketing Strategy Essay MKS0030 â€Å"When a consumer brand does a really good job, it becomes a cultural icon, and that’s what Corona has done. † â€Å"We have to keep up the image of the good life that other brands have tried to get into. † – Rohit Deshpande, Professor, Harvard Business School 1 – Fernandez, CEO of Grupo Modelo2 Corona Extra (Corona), the beer brand of Mexico’s Grupo Modelo (Modelo) Brewing Company had been the number one imported beer in the United States since 1997. Modelo’s US importers, Barton Beers Ltd. (Barton) and Gambrinus Inc. Gambrinus), played a vital role in promoting the brand and selling around 97 million packs (one pack equals 12 units) by 20033 . But in early 2004, Corona faced challenges due to changing demographics such as the increasing young adult population, the growing Hispanic community, changing lifestyles and increasing incomes. Also, retail consolidation, which decreased the number of wholesalers and retailers dist ributing the brand, compelled distributors to stock too many brands at one outlet. Consequently, Modelo’s US bound shipments of the brand, which grew in double digits through the 1990s increased by less than 2% in 20044 . Furthermore, apart from the brands in the US like Heineken and Budweiser, other imported brands from Mexico like Tecate brewed by Formento Economico Mexicano (FEMSA), also gave Corona a stiff competition. Carlos Fernandez (Fernandez), the CEO of Modelo, reorganised the company’s marketing strategies in the US to overcome the challenges. Modelo introduced new television ads targeted at the growing Hispanic consumers and introduced promotional offers. Acquiring an import contract from one of its two importers in the US and establishing its own distribution network, was also being considered as a part of the reorganising process. This was to minimise the middleman fees and improve profits. But, the idea of setting up its own distribution network in the United States carried the risk of undermining the relationships with the importers who contributed to the brand’s success. Corona in USA: The Challenging Times The growth in the US beer industry was triggered by the introduction of lager beer5 between 1840s and 1850s. Since then, the country was known to be the largest beer consuming market in the world. Beer accounted for 67% of alcohol consumption in the United States6 . The market for beer in US consisted of essentially three segments-domestic, imports and speciality beers. Bud light, Budweiser, Coors light, Miller lite and Natural light etc were the top selling beers in the domestic beer category. Major drivers of the beer sales in the US included demographics, pricing, and product innovation. 1 2 3 4 5 6 Geri Smith, â€Å"Life’s A Beach for Corona—or is It,† www. businessweek. com . com, February 7th 2005 Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. A general term for beer made with bottom fermenting yeast Center for science in the public interest, â€Å"Beer consumption in the United States†, www. spinet. org, October 2001 This case study was written by Sujatha under the direction of T Phani Madhav, IBSCDC. It is intended to be used as the basis for class discussion rather than to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of a management situation. The case was compiled from published sources.  © 2005, IBSCDC. No part of this publica tion may be copied, stored, transmitted, reproduced or distributed in any form or medium whatsoever without the permission of the copyright owner. Do No t Co py Corona: The Mexican Beer’s Marketing Strategies in USA MKS0030 Corona: The Mexican Beer’s Marketing Strategies in USA To supply to the eastern United States, Modelo appointed a second importing agent, Gambrinus Inc. in 1986 headed by Carlos Alvarez, a former in-charge of Modelo’s export department. With this, the sales of Corona increased by 170% by 19867 and by 1988, the sales throughout the United States reached 20 million packs. With increased sales Corona became the number two imported beer in the US after the Dutch beer, Heineken. During the same time, Modelo also set up a subsidiary, Procermex Inc. Procermex) in SanAntonio, Texas to monitor Modelo’s operations in the US territory. Procermex coordinated, supervised and supported the activities of its two US importers and their network of around 800 distributors. Procermex also provided extensive marketing support to Corona and the other Modelo brands in the US while licensing Modelo’s Corona trademark for a wide variety of collateral merchandise. Procerme x also spent huge amounts on monitoring the use of its popular trademark on items of clothing. The distinctive image of Corona was that the brand was packaged in exclusive non-returnable longneck and clear bottles. This packaging played a vital role in the sales of Corona, because all other brands (the domestic as well as the imported) in the US came in returnable longneck bottles, which were difficult to store. â€Å"That’s quite an important aspect. You think back to before 1987, you couldn’t drink off a longneck in any bar, unless you were in a small town bar and that bar was storing all those returnable. The distributor was picking them up and taking them to the brewery to be washed and refilled. The typical high-volume bar or nightclub would not be serving longnecks,† said Carlos Alverez8 . This distinctive packaging helped Corona quickly gain popularity in the imported beer segment. But soon, the domestic brewer Anheuser Busch followed by many other domestic brands began adopting similar packaging. Subsequently, non- returnable longnecks became common in the US beer markets and Corona’s popularity for its unique packaging slowly declined which affected overall sales9 . Moreover, at that time the government also doubled the federal excise tax on beer (an increase from $0. 65 to $1. 30 per 24 bottle pack), resulting in an increase in the consumer price of beer. Consequently, by the end of 1991, the sales of the imported beers including Corona declined by 15%. Furthermore, Anheuser Busch, having a 50. 2% stake in Modelo, regarded Corona as a threat to its brands in the United States. As a result, the company applied all the tactics it could to derail Corona in US10 . Anheuser Busch was concerned about the decreasing sales of Budweiser and its other brands due to the popularity of Corona over the years. Also, in spite of a large stake in Modelo, Anheuser Busch was not granted the import rights of Corona in the US. So it financially penalized the wholesalers who carried Corona and ran ads warning consumers that beers in clear bottles were likely to be stale. It also tried to highlight the absence of a labelled manufacturing date on the bottles of Corona. Anheuser Busch also offered continuous support to its distributors in the form of localised alternatives to Corona and launched two Mexican style beers ‘Azteca’ and ‘Tequiza’ in the US. However, Gambrinus reacted in time by absorbing the levied federal tax and preventing an increase in the price of the brand. While other brands experienced decreased sales due to price hikes, Corona sales improved by 4% in 1992 7 8 9 10 â€Å"The consolidation of Corona in North America†, www. gmodelo. com Bryson, Lew â€Å"Carlos Alverez Interviewed†, www. beveragebusiness. com Ibid. Khermouch, Gerry and Forster Julie â€Å"Is This Bud for You, August IV? † www. businessweek. com, November 11th 2002 2 Do No t Co Corona entered the United States import market in 1979 through a Chicago-based importer named Amalgamated Distillery Products Inc. (renamed Barton Beers Ltd. ). Barton Beers was the largest beer importer in 25 western states of the United States. Barton Beers gained momentum through experience and knowledge of its marketing and sales force contributing towards 45% of Corona’s sales in the United States. Corona was marketed as ‘vacation in a bottle’ beer positioned in the ‘fun in the sun’ image. By 1981, the Corona brand was launched in Austin, Texas and in four months, the brand became available in the whole of southwest and the western United States. The same year, its sales went up from 10,000 to 30,000 packs. y Imported beer was not very popular in the US till the 1980s. However, with the disintegration of the Soviet Union and dismantling of Eastern European communism in the late 1980s, trade opportunities increased in the US, expanding the economy. This saw a marked change in consumers’ demands and preferences in the United States. Higher income groups began to spend more on imported goods includin g beer. Subsequently, many foreign companies (especially Mexican) exported about 500 brands of beer to United States through importers serving as the middlemen. Heineken, a Dutch export was the first to establish itself at the top in the imported beers category of the United States. In addition, vigorous marketing by leading brewing companies also contributed to the promotion of imports. Since then, the sales of the imported beers in the country showed a continuous growth and analysts predicted that the trend was to continue for many years to come. MKS0030 Corona: The Mexican Beer’s Marketing Strategies in USA Meanwhile, Modelo was also exploring opportunities to expand into new markets and make new customers. Based on a survey report that most people were unable to purchase Corona in places such as airlines, golf courses and stadiums because of restrictions on glass bottles, the company introduced Corona in a new packaged can. This offered Corona, an opportunity to penetrate into areas such as stadiums, swimming pool bars, marinas, hotel minibars, etc where glass bottles were not allowed. However, Corona in the clear non- returnable, longneck bottle remained the primary package. With expanded reach Corona went on to conquer 28. 4% market share in the imports category by 2001 with a volume growth of 16%14 . The same year, Modelo spent about $5. 6 million towards placing Corona ads on television promoting its can package. By the end of 2001, Modelo sold around 85 million packs in America through the distributors and retailers associated with Gambrinus, and Barton. Gambrinus attributed Corona’s success in the US to Modelo’s customisation of the product. According to the importer, Corona had the status of an import but was a domestic tasting beer unlike most of the imports, which had a heavier taste profile. Apart from the uniqueness of the brand, Corona’s packaging preferences also added to the popularity. Anybody can do fun-in-the-sun. But Corona’s well-executed message of Escape is what has the brand as popular today as it ever was,† said Mann, Modelo Group General Manager for Gambrinus15 . Like any other Latin beer, Corona had focussed only on capturing the non-Hispanic market till 2002. Corona’s sales in the non- Hispanic markets grew around 8 percent compared to a 2 percent growth of the overall beer market in 2002. Corona also commanded a 3. 3 percent share of the total $67. 4 billion US beer market and 30 percent of the imported beer market. Academic Writing on Riders to the Sea EssaySherer, Michael â€Å"Imports pay off†, www. beveragenet. net, April 1999 â€Å"Gambrinus drives Corona sales higher for 1st half of 2004†, op. cit. â€Å"Modelo Power Set Offers Velocity and Variety†, www. prnewswire. com, January 28th 2005 Decrease in the number of wholesalers and retailers Latest news, â€Å"Gambrinus Initiates Arbitration Against Grupo Modelo†, www. sanantonio. bizjournals. com, January 31st 2005 5 Do Apart from the competition, Modelo was also facing problems due to retail consolidation. Though the consolidation process existed since the 1980s, it gained prominence by 2004. Generally, the alcoholic beverages in the United States were channeled to the consumer through a three-tier system . The system was constituted to support the collection of federal and state excise taxes and mitigate the risk of sales to minors. Under this system, the imported beer was transferred to the distribution warehouses of the importer or the brewer for temporary storage. The stock was later reloaded onto distribution trucks and delivered to individual retailers through a routing system. Groceries, convenience channels as well as package tores played a vital role in this system. However, the trend towards retail consolidation29 -both at the brewer level and distributor level brought about a major change in the brewing industry. While consolidation at the brewer level combined capacities, skills and resources, inturn encouraging a stable competitive environment, the consolidation at the wholesaler and retailer levels had the maximum impact. Many wholesalers were forced to take on new brand portfolios either because their primary supplier had merged with another brewer, or because the wholesalers themselves had consolidated. Analysts observed that in many cases wholesalers no longer had a single brewer providing majority of their volume, dividing the loyalties and diluting the focus. Since retail consolidation started, the number of wholesalers had declined from more than 5,000 nationwide in 1970 to fewer than 2,500 in 2003. No t Co As a part of promotional activity and to further enhance the sales of Corona as well as other Modelo beers in the United States, Gambrinus introduced a ‘Modelo power set’ offer to its retailers to position their displays. The Modelo portfolio with Corona extra and light, Modelo especial, Negra Modelo and Pacifico brands is uniquely positioned to offer retailers velocity and variety. Out of stocks on brands like Corona are huge missed opportunities for the retailers,† said Don Mann28 . py and MADtv. The Beverage Marketing Corporation credited the success of the Corona brand to the ability of the importers’ to market to both mainstream Americans and th e Hispanic market. In addition, Modelo also continued its successful partnering with Jimmy Buffet (veteran singer in the United States) in promoting the brand. According to Gambrinus, Corona never built its huge sales on critical acclaim of its light, quenching character. It was the ‘vacation in a bottle’ image supported by advertisements on beach. Commenting on the changing preferences of US customers, Jeff Coleman, president of Paulaner NA, said, â€Å"It used to be they wanted individuality, but now they accept mass-marketed imports. †26 Though the beer industry experts predicted a further decline in Corona’s profit margins after a year-end price hike in 2003, improved marketing and promotional activities proved otherwise. Modelo’s reported sales increased by nearly 8% in mid-2004. The growth in the sales was more than the 6% nationwide average. â€Å"We developed a Q1 promotional strategy to help offset affects of the increase with our distributor partners. Our investments in advertising and an improving economy have also helped,† said Don Mann27 . MKS0030 Corona: The Mexican Beer’s Marketing Strategies in USA volume in the country maintaining cordial relations with the channels of distribution. Nevertheless, Modelo believed that Gambrinus was unlikely to win the arbitration due to lack of an automatic renewal clause in the agreement. As far as Modelo was concerned, it was analysing various alternatives for its east coast operations, working on two choices. Firstly, ending the contract with Gambrinus and continuing with a single importer, Barton. Modelo banked on Barton beers due to its industry knowhow and the relationship it enjoyed with its distributors and wholesalers in the United States. Also, Barton unlike Gambrinus represented only five of the top 20 imported beer brands focusing on a limited but carefully targeted portfolio. Barton also had a record of adapting to changing industry trends quickly capitalizing on evolving consumer tastes and market place changes. During the initial years of struggle to boost its export value to United States, Modelo sought out agreements with local importers and distributors taking advantage of their experience and knowledge of their respective markets. A number of these partnerships became very important to Modelo. Over the years, Modelo, itself mastered distribution skills and its steady relationship with the distributors or wholesalers made it more difficult to justify using importers. As a result, Fernandez was on the lookout for opportunities to exercise more control over operations by handling its own distribution. But the choice had the likelihood of incurring increased operating expenses and lower gross margins as a result of heavy packaging costs. However, Modelo believed that the profit margins after eliminating the middlemen and a lower operating expense base would offset the risk. By eliminating middlemen, Modelo expected to add about 5. 6% to the overall operating income in the United States or about $64 million annually31 . In 2004, Modelo’s exports to the United States carried less than 4% of the expenses since the importer had absorbed the transportation costs. But, though importers gave Modelo the opportunity to operate with a relatively low expense base by taking delivery of the goods at the factory, analysts believed that they also eat up a considerable portion of Modelo’s profit margins On the other hand, Anheuser Busch was also trying to get the distribution rights of Corona by allowing its wholesalers to stock the brand although it is a non-AnheuserBusch brand. By showing a good track record of Corona sales at its distribution outlets, Anheuser Busch was looking to please Modelo when the importing contract comes up for renewal. Nevertheless, Modelo’s plan to buy the import contracts attracted displeasure of its major distributors in the US. Experts however predicted that, Modelo would take direct control of its imports into US, considering the company’s knowhow of the US industry and its existing relationship with distributors and wholesalers. 31 â€Å"Life is a Corona – or is it? † op. cit. 6 Do No t Co py MKS0030 Corona: The Mexican Beer’s Marketing Strategies in USA Annexure I Top Beer Brands in the US Bud Light Budweiser Coors Light Miller Lite Natural Light Busch Corona Extra Busch Light Miller High Life Miller Gen. Draft Heineken Anheuser Busch Anheuser-Busch Coors Brewing Miller Brewing Anheuser-Busch Anheuser-Busch Barton/Gambrinus Anheuser-Busch Miller Brewing Miller Brewing Heineken USA Source: Sherer, Michael â€Å"Breewing up business: beer industry execs offer their take on what’s Brewing†, www. findarticles. com, November-December 2002 Annexure II Market Shares of the Leading Brands in the Imported Beers Category 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 No t Corona Extra Heineken Labatt Blue Tecate Foster’s Guinness Amstel Light Beck’s Molson (all) Bass RANK BRAND Source: Prince, Greg W â€Å"Here’s to Diversify†, Beverage marketing corporation (High Beam), May 15th 2002 7 Do Co py ’01 GROWTH +15. 9% -1. 1% +11. 3% +8. 2% +2. 2% -1. 0% +21. 7% 0. 0% -31. 7% +2. 7% MKS0030 Corona: The Mexican Beer’s Marketing Strategies in USA Annexure III Growth of Older Age Groups and Hispanics to 2020 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% 19. 0% 10. 4% 4. 4% 34. 0% 55. 8% Source: â€Å"Responding to Changing Demographics and Lifestyles†, www. deloitte. com, February 14th 2005 Annexure IV Increased Media Spending by the Beer Producers Low-Alcohol Refresher 8% No t Wine 6% Source: The center onAlcohol Marketing and youth, â€Å"Television:Alcohol’s VastAdland†, http://camy. org/research/tv1202/ , March 24th 2005 8 Do Co Distilled Spirits 0% Beer and Ale 86% Total 0-9 20-44 45-64 65+ py 67. 8% 5. 2% White/not Hispanic Hispanic MKS0030 Corona: The Mexican Beer’s Marketing Strategies in USA Annexure V Key Beer Consumer Targets Average Per Capita Consumption Male Female 21-27 28 34 35 49 50+ 0 50 Per capita beer consumption among male consumers is 67% higher than average 100 Co 150 200 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 Per Capita Consumption Index Source: â€Å"Bud: This Bud’s for you†, www. som. yale. edu, November 17th 2004 Annexure VI Projection of the Increase in Population Between 21 to 27 years No t 29 28 27 26 25 24 23 22 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 Population (in millions) Year Age 21-27 Source: â€Å"Bud: This Bud’s for you†, www. som. yale. edu, November 17th 2004 9 Do 2010 py Per capita beer consumption among 21-27 year old consumers is more than double the average 250 MKS0030 Corona: The Mexican Beer’s Marketing Strategies in USA Annexure VII Hispanic Population in the United States Central and South American 14. 3 Puerto Rican Cuban 8. 6 3. 7 6. Source: US Census Bureau â€Å"The Hispanic Population in the United States†, www. census. gov/prod/2003pubs/p20545. pdf, June 2003 Source: â€Å"Bud: This Bud’s for you†, www. som. yale. edu, November 17th 2004 10 Do No t Annexure VIII Three Tier Systems in the Distribution Process of Beer Tier 1: Producers Wineries / B rewers / Distilleries Excise taxes are collected on the transaction between producers wholesalers BUD, RKY, STZ, MOND Tier 2: Wholesalers Liquor / Wine / Beer wholesalers Excise taxes are collected on the transaction between wholesalers retailers Southern Wines Spirits, Charmer Industries Tier 3: Retailers Convenience stores / Package stores / Grocery stores Bars / Restaurants / Private clubs / Airlines Sales taxes are collected on the transaction between retailer consumer Stop Shop, Shaws, Chili’s, Costco, TGI Fridays Co Other Hispanic py Mexican 66. 9